{"id":8553,"date":"2025-09-24T20:55:22","date_gmt":"2025-09-24T17:55:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/salaamedia.org\/news\/?p=8553"},"modified":"2025-09-24T21:07:15","modified_gmt":"2025-09-24T18:07:15","slug":"towards-ceasefire-deal-in-sudan-can-the-quads-ambitious-plan-succeed-where-jeddah-failed","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/salaamedia.org\/news\/en\/2025\/09\/24\/towards-ceasefire-deal-in-sudan-can-the-quads-ambitious-plan-succeed-where-jeddah-failed\/","title":{"rendered":"Towards Ceasefire Deal in Sudan: Can the Quad\u2019s Ambitious Plan Succeed Where Jeddah Failed?\u00a0"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1000\" height=\"1000\" src=\"https:\/\/salaamedia.org\/news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/Sami-Saeed-1-1.jpg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-8556\" srcset=\"https:\/\/salaamedia.org\/news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/Sami-Saeed-1-1.jpg 1000w, https:\/\/salaamedia.org\/news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/Sami-Saeed-1-1-150x150.jpg 150w, https:\/\/salaamedia.org\/news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/Sami-Saeed-1-1-768x768.jpg 768w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left\" id=\"yiv0854970664docs-internal-guid-d915709f-7fff-2e02-9324-e7e31202f052\"><em>By Sami Abdelhalim Saeed, PhD<\/em><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Two Diplomatic Initiatives for One Crisis<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\">On September 12, 2025, the Quad\u2014comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States of America\u2014released a&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.state.gov\/releases\/office-of-the-spokesperson\/2025\/09\/joint-statement-on-restoring-peace-and-security-in-sudan\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">joint statement<\/a>&nbsp;proposing a path to end the conflict in Sudan. The statement recalls that the war has provoked the world\u2019s worst humanitarian crisis and poses grave risks to regional peace and security. The Quad ministers called for an initial three-month humanitarian truce to facilitate the swift entry of humanitarian aid, which should lead to a permanent ceasefire and an inclusive transition process immediately.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Earlier, in May 2023, the United States and Saudi Arabia facilitated lengthy negotiations between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), resulting in the signing of the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/2021-2025.state.gov\/jeddah-declaration-of-commitment-to-protect-the-civilians-of-sudan\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan<\/a>. Both the Jeddah Declaration and the Quad proposal share the fundamental goal of ending the conflict in Sudan, protecting civilians, and facilitating humanitarian aid. However, there are significant differences in their scope, approach, and the political context in which they were created.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Shared Foundations and Core Similarities Between the Initiatives<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Humanitarian Focus<\/strong>:&nbsp;Both initiatives prioritise addressing the humanitarian crisis. They call for the protection of civilians, ensuring safe passage, and providing unhindered access for humanitarian assistance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Adherence to International Law<\/strong>:&nbsp;Both documents explicitly reference the obligations of the warring parties under International Humanitarian Law. The Quad proposal even references the commitments made in the Jeddah Declaration, indicating a continuity of purpose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Rejection of a Military Solution<\/strong>:&nbsp;Both statements agree that the conflict cannot be resolved militarily and that a political solution is the only viable path forward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Civilian-Led Governance<\/strong>:&nbsp;Both initiatives emphasise the importance of a future Sudanese government being led by civilians. They emphasise that the Sudanese people, not the warring parties, should determine their country\u2019s future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>External Mediation<\/strong>:&nbsp;Both are products of external diplomatic efforts. The Jeddah Declaration was facilitated by Saudi Arabia and the United States. At the same time, the Quad proposal involves a broader coalition of regional and international powers (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the U.S.).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Key Differences in Scope and Approach<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Scope and Detail<\/strong>:&nbsp;The Jeddah Declaration is a \u201cDeclaration of Commitment\u201d focused on specific, on-the-ground rules of conduct for the warring parties regarding civilians and humanitarian aid. It is essentially a humanitarian and short-term ceasefire framework. In contrast, the Quad proposal is a more comprehensive political roadmap. It not only addresses humanitarian issues but also lays out a detailed timeline for a political transition, including a three-month humanitarian truce followed by a nine-month transition to civilian rule.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Actors Involved<\/strong>:&nbsp;This is a crucial distinction. The Jeddah Declaration was a direct agreement signed by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The Quad proposal is a joint statement from a group of concerned nations, not a direct agreement between the warring parties themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\">This is the fundamental point at which the Quartet initiative differs from the Jeddah Declaration. The challenge facing the Quartet initiative is how to persuade the two parties to sit down for negotiations and sign a ceasefire agreement. This challenge tests the Quartet countries\u2019 influence on both parties, as well as the strength and cohesion of the Quartet alliance itself. It is necessary to consider the Jeddah Declaration as part of the negotiating framework, as it represents the foundations of the ceasefire and was previously signed by the parties under the auspices of Saudi Arabia and the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Rejection of Specific Groups<\/strong>:&nbsp;The Quad proposal goes a step further by explicitly rejecting a role for \u201cviolent extremist groups part of or evidently linked to the Muslim Brotherhood\u201d in Sudan\u2019s political future. This political dimension was not explicitly stated in the initial Jeddah Declaration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\">After the war lasted for more than two years, the role of extremist and violent groups became prominent. Social media has begun documenting the roles of these groups and the crimes they commit. Due to their danger and clearly growing role, the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/home.treasury.gov\/news\/press-releases\/sb0246\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">US Treasury Department<\/a>&nbsp;issued sanctions against some of them, describing them as a threat to regional stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>External Military Support<\/strong>:&nbsp;The Quad proposal specifically calls for an end to external military support to the conflict parties, acknowledging a key factor that has prolonged the war. The Jeddah Declaration, while focused on the actions of the SAF and RSF, did not explicitly address the role of foreign powers in supplying them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>An Uphill Battle: Challenges Facing the Quad Proposal<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Despite its comprehensive nature, the Quad proposal faces several significant challenges, primarily stemming from its nature as a high-level diplomatic plan rather than a signed agreement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Lack of Buy-in from Warring Parties<\/strong>:&nbsp;The most immediate challenge is the lack of direct commitment from the SAF and RSF. The Sudanese government, aligned with the SAF, has already rejected the proposal. It has pushed back against the suggestion of being excluded from a post-war transition, arguing that only the Sudanese people, led by existing institutions, should decide their future. Both the SAF and the RSF are still pursuing a military victory, making it unlikely that they will agree to a political process that would sideline them. The SAF has repeatedly refused direct negotiations with the RSF, a stance observers attribute to the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood within key military institutions, which insist on being part of the future political equation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Failure of Past Agreements<\/strong>:&nbsp;The Jeddah Declaration itself, despite being a signed commitment, was repeatedly violated. This history of non-compliance raises doubts about whether the warring parties will honour a new proposal, especially one perceived as being imposed from the outside. Members of the former National Congress Party and Islamists within the military fear any future change that might lead to accountability for past crimes and corruption. This fear is also present within the RSF leadership, which has committed widespread violations of the rules of war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>External Influence and Proxy Conflicts<\/strong>:&nbsp;The proposal\u2019s call to end external military support acknowledges a significant challenge. The conflict is fueled by foreign powers providing arms and funding to both sides. Persuading these external actors to cease their support is a significant diplomatic hurdle, complicated by the fact that some Quad members have themselves been accused of taking sides.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Internal Divisions within Sudan<\/strong>:&nbsp;The proposal calls for an \u201cinclusive and transparent transition process.\u201d However, unifying Sudan\u2019s diverse political and civil society groups is a monumental task. The conflict has deepened existing political, ethnic, and regional divisions, with numerous factions holding competing visions for the country\u2019s future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Ambitious Timeline and Weak Enforcement<\/strong>:&nbsp;The proposed timeline\u2014a three-month truce followed by a nine-month transition\u2014is highly ambitious given the ongoing hostilities. Without a robust and effective enforcement mechanism, this timeline risks being disregarded, as were previous ceasefire attempts. The Quad\u2019s ability to \u201cexercise their good offices\u201d and \u201cdiscuss further steps\u201d may be insufficient to compel compliance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Whatever else is said about the Quad Initiative, it is the result of international and regional consensus to halt the devastating war that has been ongoing in Sudan since 2023, during which thousands of people have died. The country\u2019s infrastructure has been destroyed to an extent unprecedented in any other war. The initiative came after the world had remained silent on the war in Sudan for so long that the Sudanese felt the world had abandoned them to death, destruction, and genocide. This initiative is expected to achieve many milestones in favour of peace if it succeeds in engaging all influential actors in the Sudanese political scene and exerting pressure on the warring parties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left\"><em><a href=\"https:\/\/ancl-radc.org.za\/about-us\/organisational-structure?view=article&amp;id=619&amp;catid=9\">Dr Saeed<\/a>, a Sudanese constitutional lawyer, is the Vice President of the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ancl-radc.org.za\/\">African Network of Constitutional Lawyers (ANCL),<\/a>&nbsp;based in Cape Town, South Africa. He can be reached via: advosami@gmail.com<\/em><\/h6>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Sami Abdelhalim Saeed, PhD Two Diplomatic Initiatives for One Crisis On September 12, 2025, the Quad\u2014comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States of America\u2014released a&nbsp;joint statement&nbsp;proposing a path to end the conflict in Sudan. The statement recalls that the war has provoked the world\u2019s worst humanitarian crisis and poses [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":8554,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[131,133],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8553","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","category-articles"],"aioseo_notices":[],"lang":"en","translations":{"en":8553},"pll_sync_post":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/salaamedia.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8553"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/salaamedia.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/salaamedia.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/salaamedia.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/salaamedia.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8553"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/salaamedia.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8553\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8557,"href":"https:\/\/salaamedia.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8553\/revisions\/8557"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/salaamedia.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8554"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/salaamedia.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8553"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/salaamedia.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8553"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/salaamedia.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8553"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}