SalaaMedia: July 2025
Beyond the alleged acceptance of a week Humanitarian Truce by the Leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Lieutenant General Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan, a bigger lie is lying. A possible ceasefire was claimed be suggested by United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres during a telephone conversation with The General Al- Burhan, aiming at halting the fighting in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. However, the news wasn’t reported on the official United Nations news website. Conversely, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have firmly rejected any partial truce, insisting on a nationwide ceasefire accompanied by a comprehensive agreement, instead.
Previously, Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Commander, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo dismissed the possibility of negotiations leading to a ceasefire with the SAF, ceasing a conflict since April 2023. In a speech to his soldiers on June 22, 2025, Daglo labelled negotiations with the SAF as a waste of time, arguing that they do not intend to stop the war but merely to buy time for Burhan to strengthen his position. However, Sudanese journalist Aziz Al-Nour stated during an interview with (SalaaMedia) that the Secretary-General of the United Nations did not propose a Truce for El Fasher; instead, their discussion centered on targeting aid and protecting humanitarian convoys, particularly after attacks on a relief convoy in North Darfur’s Al-Kuma locality. Meanwhile, Sudanese affairs researcher Al-Tijani Al-Hajj posits that SAF’s agreement to the Truce does not reflect a genuine commitment to end the war. Rather, it is a response to a deteriorating relationship with their allies due to shifting international dynamics. He added that RSF’s rejection of the Truce also fits within this context; at best, it serves as a maneuver to strengthen their negotiating position, especially now that they are no longer acting alone following the formation of a founding coalition.
Since the war broke-out in Sudan, ten humanitarian truces have been announced between April 15, 2023, and early July 2023, with durations ranging from several hours to a week, most of which were either violated or not fully honored.
Given the complexities arising from the conflict and the diverse motivations of the various military actors involved, is there any real opportunity for a ceasefire agreement?
Sudanese Armed Forces
SAF has been established in 1925 as the Sudan Defense Force under joint British Egyptian rule, primarily comprising Sudanese soldiers. Following the country’s independence in 1956, this existing framework and personnel laid the groundwork for the formation of the Sudanese Armed Forces. Consequently, some scholars argued that these legacy positions the Sudanese military as one of the colonial institutions inherited from British Egyptian colonialism. According to the Sudanese Armed Forces Law, the military is tasked with safeguarding the country’s sovereignty, defending and upholding the constitutional system, ensuring national safety, and protecting against internal and external threats, as well as promoting respect for the rule of law, democratic governance, and human rights. However, critics contend that SAF failed to fulfil these responsibilities, having intervened in political affairs through multiple coups against democratic governments, beginning just two years after independence, with notable events in 1958, 1969, 1989, and 2021. Furthermore, the history of the armed forces has been marred by internal divisions and factions that have compromised their national integrity. Over the past sixty years, SAF have engaged in numerous conflicts with various armed movements and formed military-political alliances, such as the National Democratic Alliance and the Revolutionary Front. Recently, a new coalition has emerged, distancing itself from the regimes that came to power through military coups, thereby reinforcing the armed forces’ role as instruments of dictatorship in the country. The armed forces also have a long-standing history of creating armed militias to assist in conflicts across different regions of Sudan, including peace forces established at the onset of the Salvation government, as well as popular defense forces, border guards, central reserves, rapid support, and other groups affiliated with tribes and Islamic organizations.
Rapid Support Forces
The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) were established in 2013, upon a bill passed by the Sudanese parliament, during President Omar Al-Bashir’s regime. The created par-military forces were initially tasked with combating rebel movements in Darfur and South Kordofan regions. Their responsibilities have since broadened to include collaboration with (the Army, Police, and Intelligence Service) to bolster the security apparatus of the Salvation regime in various cities, including the capital, Khartoum. They were also assigned to combat human trafficking, with coordination and support from the European Union in 2015. Nevertheless, they have operated in the desert region as well as the triangle between Sudan, Libya, and Egypt. The Rapid Support Forces participated in the Firm Storm operation against the Houthis in Yemen alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces.
Following the commencement of 2018s December Revolution, RSF Commander declared support of the revolution that ultimately ousted former President Omar Al-Bashir. As a result, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, subsequently secured a position on both the military and the Sovereign Council. During the four-year transitional period, RSF’s combatants increased from 25,000 to about 60,000 and 100,000 officers, and non-commissioned officers, by April 2023.
Multiplicity of Weapons and Inconsistency of Loyalties
The ongoing conflict in Sudan has numerously multiplied the armed factions aligning with various parties, resulting in a multi-faceted war. This complexity poses significant challenges for establishing a unified command, primarily due to the divergent interests and objectives of the involved armed groups.
Journalist, Aziz Al-Nour, says that the armed factions fighting alongside SAF are influencing the decisions of army commanders, particularly those of the Joint Forces. Meanwhile, the Islamist-led factions operating out of the army’s control are complicate the situation. Consequently, SAF commanders are struggling to negotiate a ceasefire agreement with the RSF. The difficulties inherent in this scenario are exemplified by the Manama Agreement. Al-Nour highlighted that the situation is equally complex for RSF, by forming the current alliance (Tasis), and engaging in joint military operations with the SPLM-North under Abdel- Aziz Alhilu leadership. He stresses, “any ceasefire agreement between SAF and RSF will not be feasible without the inclusion of Tasis Alliance and Port Sudan bloc”. Underscoring possible conflict between factions excluded from the ceasefire and parties supporting the agreement.
SRF Allies
In early months of the conflict, RSF have formed alliances with several armed groups, notably Shujaan Kordofan Movement (Gallantries of Kordofan), commanded by, Rahamt-allah Mahdi – known as (Jalaha)- who was killed in Khartoum; and a group led by, Abdullah Hussein, who died in Al-Jazeera State; as well as Tamazuj Movement, led by Mohamed Ali Qureshi.
In February 2025, under Tasis Alliance, various armed factions including the SPLM-North, which controls parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The faction advocating for a secular state through a new Sudan project, is believed to receive undisclosed support from sympathetic regional actors. In addition, to the Sudan Liberation Movements – the Transitional Council, led by Al-Hadi Idris, the Sudan Liberation Forces, led by Taher Hajar, the Sudanese Alliance, led by Hafez Abdel Nabi, and the Justice and Equality Movement, led by Suleiman Sandal, who also joint the new alliance.
SAF Allies
Significantly, the Eastern armed groups, led by Al-Amin Daoud, have emerged, advocating for fair representation for the people in the East Sudan region. While there is no documented evidence of direct external support, Daoud claimed in a press conference held in Port Sudan on January 4, 2025, that his forces have received support and training in Eritrea.
As the war progressed, an armed coalition emerged, consisting of various movements from the Darfur region, collectively referred to as the (Joint Forces), including the Sudan Liberation Movement, led by Mino Arko Minawi, and the Justice and Equality Movement, led by Gabriel Ibrahim. The group also consisted of splinter groups from the Sudan Liberation Movement- the Transitional Council and the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces, as well as forces under Mustafa Tambour commandment and the Sudan Shield.
In Khartoum and its surrounding areas, Islamic oriented groups were formed, such as Al-Bara Bin Malik Battalion and Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous. These groups are composed of young individuals influenced by Islamic tactical rhetoric, these groups claim to defend both religion and the homeland. They appeared at the onset of the war and are believed to have connections to unofficial support networks of certain regional Islamic movements. Tribal militias and former Popular Defense Forces have also joined the conflict, reorganizing under the (Popular Resistance Forces). Observers note that direct regional support for these groups is rarely documented, further complicating the situation.
International Warnings
Collectively, most experts and observers envision the war in Sudan as not merely a struggle between generals; instead, it is a culmination of decades of marginalization and failure to establish a true democratic civil state, further exacerbated by the accumulation of weapons beyond state control. Experts from the International Crisis Group warn that this conflict could lead to the disintegration of Sudan, transforming it into a failed state. They emphasized the importance of involving civil society in any future political resolution. Meanwhile, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) asserts that any sustainable solution must address the root causes of the conflict, which include economic and political marginalization; need for security sector reform; and unification of armed forces under civilian leadership. Analyses from Chatham House suggest that regional interventions and external interests have complicated the situation, hindering efforts to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough reaching a ceasefire.
Past Experiences
Since the onset of the war in Sudan, ten humanitarian ceasefires have been announced between April 15 to early July 2023, with each lasting from several hours to a week. Unfortunately, most of these ceasefires were violated and did not endure. Observers attribute the failure of these attempts to a lack of genuine political will from both sides to adhere to the truce, weak monitoring mechanisms, and mutual accusations of violence. Additionally, negotiations have primarily focused on humanitarian issues, neglecting to address the underlying political concerns.
Limited Opportunities
The conflicting agendas among allied parties to the war – driven by tribal interests, political ambitions, or competition over resources – undermined ceasefire opportunities. The situation is further complicated by the regional and international support to the warring parties and the absence of a central leadership capable of enforcing compliance with any agreements. The high levels of ongoing violations also created significant challenges for short-term reconciliation, compounded by a lack of trust among the warring parties, each striving for a decisive military victory.
Peace studies researcher Dr. Atef Ajeeb, notes that there are fundamental obstacles hindering any agreement, in terms of conflicting interests, such as (RSF’s rejection of the Truce on Al-Fasher which endorsed by SAF). These circumstances illustrate a lack of trust and differing priorities. Ajeeb argues that the previously violated truces, like Jeddah Truce of May 2023, have led both parties to approach negotiations with deep scepticism. He points out that RSF views the truces as a mean to reorganize their ranks, while SAF seek to strengthen their positions. He also emphasizes that the presence of numerous factions – armed movements, tribal militias, and groups with economic interest – further complicates the negotiation efforts. Any potential agreement would require consensus, which appears unrealistic at this time, considering the lack of genuine desire for peace. Each party seems to depend on the conflict to ensure achieving its objectives: RSF aims to legitimize its role as a political force through military control, while SAF strives to restore its prestige and regain strategic areas such as Al- Fasher.
A ceasefire monitoring expert, who requested anonymity, dismissed the likelihood of an imminent end to the fighting, particularly due to ongoing military actions and the emergence of additional armed militias. He observed that previous agreements involved a limited number of parties, but the current situation – with numerous armed groups – complicates control efforts. This complexity necessitates significant engagement from civil society and increased pressure from both the Sudanese population and the international community.
Dr. Atif Ajeeb acknowledged a flicker of hope, though under challenging conditions. He pointed-out the increasing international pressure, such as Security Council sanctions, assets freezing targeting leaders, and referrals to the International Criminal Court, which could alter the dynamics for the conflicting parties. He suggested that the exhaustion of resources and depletion of human capital might prompt smaller factions to encourage their leaders to seek a settlement. Dr. Ajeeb also highlighted the potential for new opportunities if regional initiatives are unified and if neighboring countries, such as Egypt and the UAE, cease their selective support to the factions. He stated, “Hope for comprehensive peace rests on two critical factors: the evolution of international pressure that makes the cost of war unsustainable for both sides – by banning oil exports or freezing assets – and emergence of a unified civil leadership that authentically represents national interests and compels the military to engage in serious negotiations”. He added, “Currently, signs are unfavorable, yet in the field of peace studies, we maintain that even the most complex conflicts ultimately resolved at the negotiating table.”
The Sudanese conflict represents a multifaceted humanitarian and political crisis that demands a thorough solution. The array of armed factions, conflicting interests, lack of trust, historical involvement of military in politics, and the support of competing external parties, hinder the pursuit of a permanent ceasefire and sustainable peace.
Moving forward necessitates coordinated regional and international efforts, as well as unified internal pressure from Sudanese civil forces and civil society, to encourage the warring parties to engage in meaningful negotiations and abandon military approaches. The objective is to work toward establishing a civil, democratic state that meets the aspirations of citizens for security, justice, and development. Dr. Atif Ajeeb’s question remains pertinent: “How much will the Sudanese people endure before the parties recognize that war is a losing proposition for all?”